Econometrics and the Design of Economic Reform by Michael Bruno
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES 
ECONOMETRICS AND THE DES  ICN OF ECONOMIC REFORM 
Michael Bruno 
Working Paper No.  2718 
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC  RESEARCH 
1050  Massachusetts  Avenue 
Cambridge,  MA  02138 
September  1988 
This research is part of NBER's research program in International Studies. 
Any opinions expressed are those of the author  not those of the National 
Bureau of Economic Research. NBER  Working Paper #2718 
September 1988 
ECONOMETRICS AND THE DESICN OF  ECONOMIC REFORM 
ABSTRACT 
The concepr of  Economic Reform  ia described as a planned shift from one, 
Pareto  inefficient, but quasi-stable, equilibrium  (or 'trap') to a new Pareto 
superior equilibrium which  is, or  is designed to become, stable  too.  The 
concept is applied to recent  'shock'  stabilization programs, with  special 
reference to Israel, where  the economy was credibiy shifted from  a 3-digit 
inflationary process with  considerable inertia, to relative price stability 
with  higher real growth, at only small adjustment costs, by  means of a 
'heterodox' plan.  This two-pronged stabilization program consisted of  a 
substantial correction of  budget and external account 'fundamentals' 
together with  a synchronized, wage-price-exchange  rate freeze.  The idea 
is theoretically rationalized within a simple dual equilibrium  inflation 
model, for which  some econometric estimates are also given. 
Michael Bruno 
Oovernor 
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Jerusalem, ISRAEL Michael Bruno 
Econometrits and the Design of Economic Reform* 
Implementation  of  a  plan  of  economic actlon often precedes 
systematic  theoretical rationalization of it.  Given  the  problem 
to  be  attacked  the  policy  planner  may  think of  an  idea based  on 
some  a prtori'  sensible'  theoretical arguments  that  have  not  yet 
been  fully  worked  out.  A  set  of  numbers may  be  attached  (by 
methods  which  might  horrify  many  statistical  econometricien 
members  of  this  Society) 
.  The  idea may then become a program of 
action to be  adopted by  a  government,  after being massaged,  if  not 
muttlated,  by the political  process.  And  then,  lo  and behold,  the 
program  sometimes works in practice.  Only later  may  a  body  of 
systematic  theory  and  quantitative empirical testing develop to 
which the program and  its implementation  can  be subjected  ex—post 
and  may  be improved upon  for future respplication.  Like in other 
areas of epplied economic theory,  the  field  of  enquiry  within 
which  this  Address  is  embedded, that of Economic Policy Design 
often has  to deal with ad—hoc  programs or rules  of  action  which 
evolved  through  practIce  and  only  later  received  a  seal of 
approval of proper science. 
The  general  ares  of  my choice is  one  that has  fascinated  me 
ever  since I  became a  member of  this learned society about  thirty 
years  ago  and  was  actively  involved,  at that  time,  in  trying  to 
design  programs  for long-term development  planning  as  well  as 
short-term  national budgeting  in my  own  country.  I  asked  myself 
XBased  on  notes  prepared  for  the  PreaidAntial  .kddreas of the 
Econometric Society  deivered in  the Latin  American  meetings  in 
tordoba,  Argentina  in  August  and  in the European meetings in 
Budapest.  September  1986.  I  have  extended  the  theoretical 
discussion  somewhat  and  also  updated  some  )f  the empirical 
developments. For helpful comments  on  ad  eat  - .er  draft  I  am 
indebted to  Stanley  Fischer,  Mordechai  Fraenkel,  Elhanan  Heipman 
and  Sylvia  Piterman.  tommenta  and  suggestions  by  the  referees 
are  also gratefully acknowledged. —4- 
At this  point I would like  to remind you of  the definition  ci 
the  scope  of Econometrics and  of our society as originally statec 
by  its  founders  in  1930.  It  is  definitely  not  statistica 
econometrics  in  the  narrow  sense of the word hilt "Any  activitl 
which promises ultimately to further  unification  of  theoretica] 
and  factual  studies  in  economics shill  be within the  sphere  of 
interest of  the  society" .  Ragnar Frisch  in  the  early  years  of 
the Society  stated (1933)  "Experience has  shown  that each of  thesc 
three view-potnts of statistics,  economic theory and  mathematicE 
is  a  necessary,  but not by itself  a sufficient condition for 
real  understanding  of  the  quantitative  reliEions  in  moderr 
economic  life.  It  is  the  unification  of  all  three that 
powerful  and..  .that  constitutes econometrics." 
Thus the development of  input—output  analysis  and  chat  of 
static  and  dynamic  linear  programming  models  in  development 
planning  in  the  1960's  comes  under  a  broader  definition  of 
econometrics,  as  applied to  policy design.  There  were parallel 
developments  in  decision  theory  under  uncertainty  that  hays 
greatly  contributed to  the  broadening of  the  scope of this general  field.  Two  of  my  illustrious  predecessors  devoted  their 
presidential  eddresses  to  some  of  the  most  pertinent  issues  - 
Arrow  in 1956  ("statistics  and Economic Theory") and Dreze in l97C 
("Econometrics  and Decision  Theory") 
By  the  end  of  the  1970's the whole  area of  eccnomic polic3 
design had certainly reached  a  much more  sophisticated  phase  (at 
least  in  its  theoretical  approach,  less  so  in  empirical 
implementability) than was  originally  set  out  by  Tinbergen  a 
quarter  of  a century earlier. However,  it had  one major drawback. 
The policy maker  in most  of  policy  designs  was  an  omnipotent 
government  much  like the  control  theory vision of  the  economy  as 
a  dumb  machine planned  and  run  by  a  clever engineer  to  achieve  a 
well  defined  objective. 
The  major  agents  in the economy, as we all  know,  talk back tc 
the government.  Unlike the  dumb  machine  they  can  incorporate 
anticipated  government  action  into their  rules  of  behaviour,  a 
fact  that  a policy designer  has  to  take  into  account.  Tinhergec 
in  his  writings  of  the 1950's was  well  aware  of  the  problem  of 
policy  design  when  "there is more than one policy maker"  and  ever 
analyzed  an  example  of  government versus  the trade unions in a 
game-like situation to  which we  shall  come  back in  our  subsequent 
discussion  (see  "Centralization  and Decentralization in  Government 
Policy",  1954).  This  line,  however,  was  not  seriously  and systematically followed up until very recently  when  game  theory 
made  its  successful entry into macroeconomics (after  staging its 
re-entry,  this time  successful, into the mainstream  of  economic 
theory) 
Another parallel development, that  of the literature based on 
the rational expectations approach (having  its  origins  in  Huth 
(1961)  brought up a critique of the use  of conventional backward- 
looking  econometrically  estimated coefficients when  applied  to 
forward-looking  policy designs  This  is the so—called Lucas  (1976) 
critique.  A very relevant example in the present context would be 
a  misguided  attempt  to  plan  the  sharp reduction of inflation 
within a model based on time series  equations  of past inflationary 
behaviour.  Here  is  a  case  in  which  a  back-of-an-envelope 
calculation  based  on  simple  input-output  wage  and  import 
coefficients  can  give  (and has been shown to give,  at least  in 
our recent  experience)  much  better  guidance  than  a  backward 
looking  model  based on  inflationary inertia. 
The  same  new  approach to  economic policy design  also brought 
up the  issue of  dynamic inconsistency (Kydland  and  Prescott,  1977) 
and  led  to  the  discussion of rules versus discretion in policy 
design  (Barro  and Gordon, 1983)  and systematically  tackled  the 
issue  of  government credibility and reputation all of which also 
have  a repeated game  theory grounding  (Kreps  and  Wilson,  1982, 
mackus and Driffill, 1985). 
Ii.  Equilibrium trap and  Economic Reform 
It  is in the  spirit of both of these  later developments  that 
I would now like to take up one sub-class  of  policy  designs  - 
that  of  economic reforms.  Let  me  again turn back to Tinbergen 
for  definitions.  He distinguished among  three  types  of  policy 
changes  varying  by the degree of change  in the underlying policy 
structure.  First,  quantitative policy constitutes  a  quantitative 
change  in  given  instruments  of  policy  (e.g.,  changes in tax 
rates).  Next comes his definition of  a qualitative policy  change, 
which  is  a  change  in  structure  keeping the foundation intact 
(e.g.,  a change in the  type of taxes  implemented).  Finally  there 
is economic reform,  "being equivalent  to changes in foundations" 
Again using Tinbergen's words  (1956)  "changes  in more  fundamental 
features  of  social organizations are the most far-reaching types 
of policy".  What is sometimes called  a 'regime change'  also  falls 
under the same heading. —8 
One conventional, or  'orthodox',  element  in  these  programs 
was  an attempted reduction in the government deficit (coupled  with 
an  initial  devaluation  and  a  monetary  squeeze)  which  is  a 
correction  of  'fundamentals'.  In the  case  of Israel the deficit 
came down  from  12-15  percent  of  GNP  throughout  the  preceding 
decade  to  a virtually balanced budget.  A  conventional  flex-price 
market  clearing  approach  would  say  that  the  correction  of 
fundamentals  is  all that  the  government  should have  been required 
to do,  implying  that  the  market  would  do  the  rest  of  the 
adjustment  to  a  lower  inflation  rate.  Yet  in all three  cases 
there was  another  major,  though less  conventional,  element  (and 
one  that  had earned these  episodes  the  term  'heterodox'  programs) 
—  an  attempt  at  a  synchronized  exchange  rate,  wage  and  price 
freeze.  In  the  case  of  Israel it took the  form of  an explicit 
social  contract between  the  three  major  parties  to  an  incomes 
policy  package  -  the  trade  unions,  the  employers'  association  and 
the  government.  What is the  theoretical  rationale  for  such  a step? 
Judging  from  our  own  experience it is  a case  in which intuition 
and  some  hand—waving  arguments  have  preceded systematic 
— 
some  vague  ideas  about  affecting  the  public's  expectations, 
establishing  government  credibility  and  the  need  for  initial 
synchronization  of  nominal  magnitudes,  under  inflationary 
inertia. 
To  convince oneself of  the  rationality of  applying a  certain 
polacy  design  and  moreover,  to convince one' s  colleagues in  the 
profession,  there is obvious need  for  a  more  firm  theoretical 
grounding.  This  is  particularly true when  controversial  policy 
measures  such  as  a  wage  and  price  freeze  (including  temporary 
price  controls)  are  involved,  While I  am  not certain that  the 
following  will eventually prove an  adequate (let alone  the  only) 
way  of  going  about the theoretical problem, I  will here attempt  a 
sketch of  the  basic idea,  which  is an  offshoot  of  work  that I have 
been doing jointly with  Stanley  Fischer  of  MIT.  It still requires 
a  more thorough working out. 
3) I had  proposed a very similar idea at an earlier stage  (Bruno, 
1981),  with  an  attempt  to  adapt  the lessons of historical 
hyperinflation experience (see Sargent, 1981)  to the  different 
local scene. —9 
III.  Multiple Inflationary Equilibria and Their Stability 
The  design of a stabilization program that we are discussing 
here involves two major components - the  removal of the source  of 
inflationary  finance  on  the  budget  deficit  side  and  the 
simultaneous  synchronization  or  'freeze'  of  nominal  price 
variables  on  a  new  low  level  of  inflation.  Two  important 
questions  immediataly  arise  -  first,  can  one  rationaliza 
theoretically  how  and  when  both  elements  of  the program are 
absolutely indispensable for rapid  disinflation?  secondly,  can 
a new low equilibrium level of the inflation  rate be sustained and 
what are  the conditions for  its stability? 
In order co tackle both these  questions  I  will  extend  an 
analytical  framework  based on deficit finance  by money and bonds 
which Stanley Fischer and I have  used  in  an  earlier  empirical 
paper  (1986)  and  whose  theoretical  properties  weredeveloped 
in other papers (1984,  1987). 
The underlying idea,  which in itself  is not new,  is  that  a 
given  amount  of  seigniorage  revenue can be collected at either 
high or low rates  of inflation [see Sargent  and  Wallace  (1984), 
and  Liviatan  (1984)].  The dual  equilibria -  a reflection of the 
Laffer curve  - imply  that an  economy  may  be  stuck  in  a  high 
inflation equilibrium  when,  with the  same  relative budget deficit, 
it could be at  a lower inflation  rate.  Which  is  the  relevant 
aqullibrium  depends  on  how  economic agents  form  expectations and 
adjust pricas  and  other nominal  magnitudes  (wages,  money  and/or 
exchange  rates)  while learning about  the  system.  It is known  that 
under adaptive expectations (with sufficiently  low coefficient  of 
adaptation)  the  low  inflation rate will be stable and the upper 
one unstable while the  roles  are reversed for  the  case  of  rapid 
adaptation  or fully rational expectations [see Aurenheimer )1973); 
Evans and yarrow )l98l);  and mruno and Fischer (1984)].  The novel 
and  more  interesting model to be  suggested  here,  however, is the 
empirically relevant non-linear case in which adjustment of  a  key 
variable  like  the exchange rate  (and therefore wages ahd prices) 
is adaptive with coefficient of  adjustment  that itself rises  with 
the  rate  of  inflation.  In this  case both equilibria could turn 
out  to be stable for some parameter values.  This has  interesting 
implications for the nature of stabilization  policy. We shall skip 
technical  detail here and consider only those features  which  are 
essential  for  the  empirical  applications  that follow (for some 
additional detail  see the Appendix to this  paper) —  10  — 
The  first  point  to note is that fiscal  policy  considerations 
may  determine  the  average  growth  rate  of  money  through the 
government  budget  constraint,  Considerting  first  the  closed 
economy,  thus  leaving  aside foreign finance (see below), we can 
write the government  budget constraint as: 
(1)  G—T=dY=H/P+E, 
where G is government expenditure,  T are  taxes,  Y  is  real  GDP, 
d  is the ratio of the deficit to GDP,  H is base money,  H are real 
indexed bonds,  and the  dot indicates  the change in  a  variable. 
Interest payments  on  bonds  are included in G. 
In  steady  state,  the  ratios  H/(PY)  and  B/Y  are  constant. 
Pccordingly  in steady state the growth  rate  of high-powered money, 
H,  or  H/H,  is  equal to the  inflation  rate  (it)  plus  the growth  rate of output (n) 
(2)  ®=rt+n. 
Similarly,  in steady state,  the growth rate  of bonds  is  equal  to 
the  growth  rate  of output (n)  .  Accordingly,  in steady state  he 
government  budget constraint becomes 
(3)  d =  (it +  n)h  + nb, 
where h denotes the ratio of the stock of real high-powered  money 
to nominal GNP (H/PY),  and  b  tile  ratio of bonds to GNP  (B/Y)  .  Let 
v  be the ratio of net wealth to GNP,  where  v = h  +  b.  Then, 
(4)  ii  =  (d  -  nv)/h. 
4. we  here suppress the difference  between bonds  indexed  to  the 
domestic  price level  and to the exchange rate,  and omit direct 
government sales  of  foreign  exchange,  which  can  be  added 
separately (see below) —  11  — 
The  use  of  the government  budget constraint (l)or  (4)  does 
not necessarily imply that the government  consciously decides on a 
particular  growth  rate  of  high-powered  modey  as  a  means of 
financing its budget deficit.  Rather,  in the present  context  it 
is more realistic to assume that the government turned to printing 
money as its last resort in budget-financing.  First  it  decided 
what  it needed to  spend and how much it could raise through taxes 
(and  in the open economy - how  much  it could borrow abroad);  then 
it  sold  as  many bonds as it could at the existing real  interest 
rate  and financed the  rest  by printing money,  As  we  shall  see 
relatively small changes in the deficit could be consistent in the 
long run with major changes in the growth rate  of H  and  thus  of 
inflation.  However,  high  real  costs  of  transition  from high 
inflation to low inflation could inhibit  such a change. 
Eguation (4)  givea one  approach  to analyzing the determinants 
of  growth rate of  the monetary base and thus,  in steady state,  of 
the inflation rate.5  The term  nv in the numerator of  (4)  is the 
amount  of  the  deficit  that  can  be  financed  by the government 
through the sale of bonds and printing of money without increasing 
their respective ratios to GNP.  The more rapid the growth rate  of 
output,  the greater the share of the deficit that can be  financed 
in  a non—inflationary  way.  The larger  the government deficit, d, 
the higher the  inflation rate  in the  steady  state.  And the larger 
the monetary base,  the lower the inflation  rate need be. 
5)  It  can  be  shown  that  out  of the steady state  the analogous 
eguation is  it  =  (d  - vn  - ir(/h,  where  V is  the  time  change of 
the  net wealth ratio  (v( In the open economy the same equation holds,  providing it  is 
reinterpreted  to  represent  the  ratio  of  domestic  government 
finance to GNF.6>  It is in this sense that  equation (4)  will  be 
applied to the Israeli data in Section III  (see Table 4). 
To embed equation (4)  into a behavioural model  we have to add 
assumptions pertaining to the demand for money and bonds.  Assume, 
for  simplicity, that consumption and savings depend on net wealth 
and  the real rate of  interest,  and  that  the  latter  is  fixed 
exogenously (by world markets or by  government  intervention  in  the 
market for bonds,  not  an unrealistic  assumption  in  the  Israeli 
case) .  This  means  that net  injection to  the  money base  d1  =  (d - 
vn)  can be considered as depending  mainly  on  policy  variables. 
However,  the amount that  the public wishes to hold in the form  cf 
base money  (h)  will  depend on expected inflation. )fle) 
6)  in the open  economy  the  budget  constraint  (1)  has  to  be 
extended to include  both the domestic and foreign deficits. Say 
dh is the domestic deficit ratio to GNP,  df  is  the  ratio  to 
GN? of the foreign deficit (net of unilateral transfers) and E± 
is  the change in net government debt  (net  of  the  change  in 
exchange reserves and including interest payments)  .  We  have 
(la)  (d1 + d)y =  + B  +  S 
where  E  is the exchange rate.  Thus, 
)lb) d1Y =  + B  + [i  - dY] 
Equation  (lb)  now  says  that  the  domestic deficit (dhY)  is 
financed not  only by domestic finance (money and bonds)  but  by 
net  sales  of foreign  exchange by the government to the public 
sector (the  term in square brackets) 
Thus equation (1)  continues to hold  providing  we  reinterpret 
d to be the 'domestic  finance ratio'  (a/P + E)/1,  which 
according to equation -  )lb)  is the difference  between the 
domestic  deficit ratio  d1, and the part that is financed by net 
foreign exchange sales  to the public (EEf/PY - df). —  13  — 
Assume  that  the  demand  for unit real  base money  h  (H/PT) 
depends negatively on expectated inflation (fle)  (again  suppressing 
the  real  rate of interest,  for simplicity)  and we shall choose an 
empirically tested semi-logarithmic (Cagan)  demand function: 
h = exp(—ane). 
Figure A depicts equations (4)  and (5)  in the  space of H  and 
ii  (or  rt)  Curve  d,  a  simple  hyperbola,  asymptotic  to 
the axes,  shows  the  combinations of  money  demand  and steady  state 
inflation  consistent with a  given net deficit injection ratio d. 
Curve  h shows  the demand for money as  a  function of  inflationary 
expectations. 
In  steady  state  inflationary  expectations are  the  same  as 
actual  inflation and equilibrium  may  thus,  in  principle,  take 
place  at  two  intersection  points  A  or  B.  If  the  lower 
intersection is stable,  then  an increase in d  (i.e.  a rise in the 
domestically  financed  deficit,  d  or  a  fall in the  rate of 
growth,  n(  showing in Figure A as  a shift from the d curve to  the 
d'  curve will involve an upward shift in steady state inflation to 
point A' 
If there  is  an  exogenous  downward  shift  in  the  demand 
schedule  for  money  (due  to  the  introduction of  money substitutes, 
e.g,  .  foreign  exchange-linked  bank  deposits(8  this will show  as  a 
laftward  shift  in  the  h  curve to  h'  and  a  further increase in 
long  run  inflation to  C' .  However,  points  such as  A,A'  or  C' 
7)  This  is  the  framework originally employed by  Liviatan  (1984). 
In  joint  work  with  Stanley  Fischer we  have  mainly  carried  out 
the  analysis  in the space of  fle and e  (growth  rate of nominal 
money)  or Tt  and 75.(See Appendix). 
Eu  This  was a practical reality in th  case of Israel and  an  old 
tradition in  inflationary  situations leading to hyper—inflation 
[(see post-second World War  Hungary  (Bomberger  and  Makinen, 
1983 . —  14  — 
are  low inflation  equilibria having respective dual  high inflation 
equilibria  B,  B'  or U'  which  are  consistent  with  the  same 
deficit  injection  ratio  (d for A, B  and  d'  for A',B'  or C',D'. 
respectively),  The upper equilibria are inefficient (i.e.,  on the 
'back'  side of the Laffer curve)  in the  sense  that the elasticity 
of demand for money at those points is above unity  and  inflation 
could  be  reduced  by  an  increase  in the  deficit.  For example. 
starting from  equilibrium at point B'  on  h  and  d'  a  further 
rightward  shift  of the curve  d'  to d* will reduce inflation to 
the point  A*  at which the inflation  tax  is  optimal  [Friedman 
)1971)j.  A  further  increase  in  the  deficit  will  imply  no 
intersection at all and inflation  may rise ad infinitum. 
The above discussion brings us to the question of dynamics of 
adjustment  from  one  equilibrium,  when  there  is  an  outside 
disturbance,  to  a  new  equilibrium.  Suppose  expectations  are 
adaptive: 
(6)  =  13)Tt  — 
Time  differentiation of equation (5)  gives 
)7a)  O-rt-n=-afte. 
Substituting for it  from equation (6)  gives the equation of motion 
for  rr: 
(5)  Tte  =  )l  - aBV'  B  (B—n—ne) 
where B = d exp  )an> 
As  is  shown  in the Appendix, end  can  be seen  from equation 
(8),  the stability  of the low inflation equilibrium )A)  depends on 
the  product  of  a )the semi- elasticity of demand for  money)  and 
B  )the  adaptation coefficient)  being less  than 1.  If a-B >  1  the 
low  level  equilibrium  becomes  unstable  and  the high inflation 
equilibrium )B) becomes the stable one  [this,  at  the  limit,  is 
also  the  case  for  fully  rational expectatiots, as Sargent and 
Wallace (1987), have shown). 
It is important  to point out that the only rationale for  the 
gradual  adjustmant  rule given in  (6)  is to  introduce  friction in 
the adjustment of some  nominal variable.  The adaptive expectation 
assumption on prices is thus  only given for illustration  purposes. 
Very similar results are obtained on the  assumption  of  rational 
expectations  when  friction comes  from lagged adjustment of money 
balances )see Bruno and Fischer,  1987)  or from the fiscal lag  (see 
Miguel,  1987).  Below we turn  to an open economy application with —  15  — 
gradual  exchange rate  adjustment  performing that  very  same  role. 
These  examples  show  that  stability  or  instability  of  an 
inflationary equilibrium may be endoqenous to  the  choice  of  an 
operating rule for  policy. 
Let  us  now return to our simple model in which the argument 
has  so  far been entirely abstract.  A  further  alteration  of  this 
model  and  a  particular interpretation of  the  variable  e turn it 
into one  which  is both  applicable  for  policy  and  particularly 
relevant  for  the  process  of  high inflation  and  a disinflation 
program such as the Israeli one  (or,  for that matter,  the  recent 
Argentinean or Brazilian programs(. 
First consider the case in which the 13  coefficient is itself 
positively dependent on inflation  or  inflationary  expectations. 
what this  means is that  a-B may be balow 1  at low inflation  rates 
and eventually rise abova  1  for high inflation  rates.  Say  there 
is  a critical inflation rate  of n  such that d(*( =  1/a.  Then  we 
have the  following possibilities: 
(a(  71  <  A stable,  B unstable. 
(b(  rt  <  a  C  A unstable,  B stable 
(c(  n.  c  n  <  it  Both  A and B  are stable. 
case  (c (  is the one  shown  in  Figure  A  for  the  smaller  budget 
deficit  d while for the upper ourve  d'  both equilibria lie above 
11*  and  thus  correspond to case (b(  .  Suppose  for some reason  the 
economy  is  stuck  at  the  high  deficit  and  high  inflation 
equrlibrium point  B'  which is stable.  The point  B'  is  a  real 
trap.  A mere cut  in the deficit will eventually lead the economy 
to  a high inflation equilibrium  B  (which,  of  course,  is  even 
less  efficient  than  having  stayed at  B').  On the  other hand, 
keeping fiscal policy invariant (namely  a  fixed  injection  ratio 
d(  but  attempting  a freeze on prices so as to jump back to the 
low inflation point  A'  will  not work either as long as  A' is  an 
unstable  equilibrium (being  above  the critical  n* rate)  .  Only  a 
combined budget cut and price freeze will  get us down to  the  low 
inflation equilibrium  A which will be stable if  n.  <  n, —  16  — 
IV.  Dynamics of Inflation in the Open Economy 
To make the argument of the previous  section  applicable  to 
the case  at hand let us reinterpret  lte  for an open economy to be 
represented by the rate of devaluation (e = &),  on  the  assumption 
that  the  actual  adjustment  of  the  exchange  rate  by  the 
authorities,  which  is  also  the  rationally  expected  rate  of 
devaluation,  follows  a  crawling  peg rule,  in which the  rate  of 
devaluation is adjusted (other than through shocks -  see  below(  to 
the  lag  between  the  rate of wage inflation (w(  and the  rate  of 
devaluation: 
(9)  =  O,  (w — a). 
The rationale for this adjustment  rule comes from  supply  of 
exports  (or  import substitutes) in the current account. Whenever 
the  real  (foreign-exchange  deflated)  wage  departs  from  an 
equilibrium  rate,  the  loss  (or gain)  in competitive power will 
induce an adjustment in the rate  of devaluation.  This  adjustment 
is  not  instantaneous  because  the  signals  on  wages  are  not 
immediately  obvious.  There may be information  lags  between  the 
time  wages  are  paid  and  the  exchange rate is adjusted (a few 
months in most cases)  and  too frequent adjustment of the  exchange 
rate  in face of variable wage behavior may  be costly.  At the  same 
time  it makes sense to assume that  the coefficient  of  adjustment 
O  will rise with a,  since the cost of error in terms  of  foreign 
exchange losses (or  gains)  mounts  with  the  rate  of  expected 
inflation (represented  by a) 
Next  assume for analytical convenience, that wage adjustment 
follows the simple rule 
(10)  w = n +  (1  — —  17  — 
Equation  (10)  implies  that  wages  are indexed partly to actual 
inflation (a)  and partly to the exchange rate.9 
If we take the  time  unit over  which rates of change (w,  a, a) 
are defined as discrete but small,  say a quarter,  then  the  wage 
indexation  coefficient  ()  will  itself  depend  on  the formal 
indexation lag,  which we know tends  to get shorter and shorter  in 
the  process  of  high  inflation (see next section for evidence). 
Thus  itself will  rise with inflation  and we may assume  '  (a)  > 
From  (10)  we  get  w  -  a  = )a - a).  Substituting into 
erstion (9)  we have 
(11)  = B)a))a  —  a) 
where  B  = eo  = B(s).  and B'>  0 
The adjustment rule  (11)  could  also  be  derived  directly 
[without  going  through  (9)  and  (10)]  from  an  alternative 
tradable/non-tradable  goods  model.  In  that  case,  however,  •a 
separate  wage-inflation  rate  link would have to be written down, 
for  a discussion  of  the  wage/exchange  rate  policy  game  (see 
below) .  In  our  empirical  illustration  we  consider  both the 
components as well  as a direct estimation  of  (11). 
0)  The rationale foc equation (10) can be based  on  the  argument 
that  a,  in  a  high  inflation  context,  comes  close  to 
representing inflationary  expectations.  Alternatively  (10) 
will  be  relevant  in  a  context in  which  a represents prices of 
home  goods  and  a  those  of  importables.  Under  the  latter 
interpretation.  however,  there  is  no  reason  why  the  'B 
coefficient  should  rise  with  inflation.  The  role  of 
unemployment in wage  adjustment is  ignored here. —  18  — 
Equation  (11)  is the same as  (6) with a replaoing Tte.  We can 
likewise replace e  by a  in the demand function for money  (5),  on 
the  assumption that money and foreign exchange holdings are close 
substitutes  in the open economy. 
Thus the adaptive  expectations  mechanism  of  the  previous 
simple  model  has been reinterpreted  for an open economy in terms 
of the dynemics of exchange rate  adjustment  with a coefficient  of 
adjustment  (B)  that  rises  with  the  rate  of  inflation.  The 
stability of  low or high  inflation will thus  very  much  depend  on 
whether  the  cagan  condition  aB(a)  <  or  >  1 holds  for  the 
relevant  rate of  inflation (or devaluation) 
.  In particular we  may 
underline  the  point  made  earlier.  An  attempt  to stabilize the 
economy  from  an initial high inflation trap requires  not  only  a 
cut  in the  deficit  by  a  permanent  move  of  a  below s  (analogous 
to *) .  But to be  able to do this  it is not enough to  slow  down 
the  rate  of  devaluation  ) through  a  reduction  of  the  B1 
coefficient)  .  Wage  indexation must  be brought  down to  the  level 
commensurate  with slow price adjustment  so that  13  c  1/a  at the 
lower devaluation (and  inflation) rate,  it.  otherwise  the  now 
low  inflation  equilibrium  (at  A)  will  not be stable and the 
system will  eventually end up at the higher inflation rate  itt. 
This  analysis is incomplete in  a number of  ways.  First  of 
all  the  complete underlying model  involving  domestic end foreign 
assets has not been spelt out.  This can be done,  but will not  be 
carried  out  here.  There is one  more  important aspect,  however: 
having to do with the dynamics of the inflationary  process,  under 
inertia  and  the  possibility  of jumps in the rate of  inflation, 
that has  to be discussed further  in  the present context. 
Equation (11)  describes  a  smooth  exchange  rate  adjustment 
process,  with  no  speculetive  attecks,  in  which  no  discrete 
devaluation of  the  exchange  rate can take place.  To  add this very 
realistic  possibility  we  rewrite  equation (11)  as a difference 
equation and add a discrete jump variable j  to  it: 
(lie)  at — a— = 13(7t_1  — St—a)  + Jt 
with  13  C  1 
where a,  = e—e—1  itt = Pt — Pt—a 
e = log  of exchange rate  p = log of price level. —  19 
— 
A  discrete upward shift of tha axchange rate by et  at  time 
t  will  show  as J- =e  att = t and  J,-1  = —e-  at  t = s + 1.  J-, 
may be a funotion of the foreign exchange exposure of the  country 
and  thus  depend  on  the  variable  B in equation (la)  and  the 
cumulative budget  deficits as  well  as  other exogenous  shocks  (such 
as  an  oil  shock).  J will  here be  taken to be  exogenous. 
Next:  for  the  short—run  dynamics of  inflation,  when  there is 
inertia,  we  can write  the  following simglified equation: 
(12)  rt  =  5Tt_-  +  (l—5)s  -  a 
This  aquation  may  be  derived  from  a  conventional  aggregate 
supply  (As)  and  aggregata  demand  (AD)  framework  with  some 
simplifying  assumptions.° 
The  degree  of  inflationary inertia (5)  may  come  froif  price 
indexation  of wages while s  comes from the cost  of  imports.  The 
shift  factor at may  reflect productivity shocks  as well as planned 
intervention  in  the  inflationary  process  by  wage  and  price 
controls. 
Equation  (12)  can  be  rewritten in  the  form 
(12)  - t-t = 5-'  )l-d))a  -  itt)  - 5i 
while  (ha)  ,  using  (12' ) /  can be rewritten as 
(13) s  -  Tt  =  S)l—S)(e_, - itt,)  +  at  + 5j 
substituting  back  into  (12')  we  finally  get  the  following 
equation: 
)14)  n—n=_, = -a +  (1—5)  J  + (1—5))1-5)E[5)1-5]''  [5J_,—a,]  i1 
lO)This  cost-based equation can  be rationalized on the  assumption 
that  under the circumstances the  AS schedule is relatively flat 
while the AD curve is relatively steep [See Bruno and  Fischer, 
1986].  Thus  AD mainly determines output and employment while 
cost—push (AS)  determines  prices  (unemployment  feedbacks  on 
wages are  here  ignored)  This type  of equation (with more lags 
and  including  other  exogenous  variables)  works  well 
empirically. —  20  — 
Equation  (14)  expresses discrete changes in the  inflation  rate as 
a function of all present and past disturbance or  jump  variables 
weighted  by  geometrically  declining  coefficients.  when 
(1 - 5)(l-B)  is small (e.g.,  when inflationary inertia 5  is  high 
and/or  when  the  price  adjustment  coefficient  B  is  high)  a 
devaluation today  (Jr) will translate  into  an  immediate  upward 
jump  in  the  inflation  rate  (rather  than  the  price  level) 
Likewise wage and/or price controls (ar)  will  cause  a  downward 
pull  on  rt,.  Equation  (14)  may  thus be used to rationalize  an 
upward pull  on it when there  are  speculative  pressures  on  the 
exchange  rate  (e.g.,  from  an  unbalanced  budget,  erosion  of 
competitive  power,  loss  of confidence,  etc.)  causing  an  expected 
exchange  rate  level  devaluation  (J)  .  It also incorporates  the 
possibility  of discrete downward jumps in Tt as a result of direct 
controls  imposed on wage and price formation when a stabilization 
effort is undertaken. 
Note that  when there is no inertia  [5=0  in  equation  (12)] 
and  no  discrete jumps  (a= J=  0), equation (lla)  is the same  as 
(11) and equation (12) degenerates to  the  equilibrium  condition 
=  it,,,  in which case we are  in the smooth world of the laws  of 
motion derived from  monetary finance as described in section in. 
The  law of motion of St is then  given from  equation (8)  with 
a  replacing  lie.  in difference—equation  form we have: 
(0  )  a., — a =  (1—aB)' 13[d exp(aat)  —n  — 
For rt we have,  from analogously rewriting (7( 
(7')  it  = d exp (ast)  + a(st+i 
—  a,)  — n 
Using  (8'  )  this  can also be rewritten as 
(15) it.  =  (l—aB)' [d exp(act)— n — aBs_1] 
How  can  one combine the long-run  money-determined smooth path  of 
rt  as  given  by  (15)  with  the  short-run  shock-and-inertia 
determination  of  the  random  walk (14)?  We may assume that  the 
actual path of n is  determined  by  whichever  gives  a  higher acceleration  number  (itt  -  m_)  .  Whenever  a shock from  (14) 
dominatas this means that the money-determined equation (7')  will 
be in temporary disequilibriurs.'t 
For  actual  application of this  framework  one may assume that 
the shocks  .j and  a  are rather rare occurrences  (J  representing 
step  devaluations  and  a  wage  and  price  controls). Thus the 
dynamic system  represented by  (8')  and  (15)  could  be  used  to 
simulate  the dynamic stability  and instability around equilibrium 
points with  the  occasional shocks  marking  the  jumps  in new initial 
conditions  on  m  and s.  This  way  of  looking at the  inflationary 
process  is usefuk in  the  present  context  because  it  helps  to 
explain: 
a)  why  equilibria,  even  if  stable,  are  only  temporary 
equolibria  (until  a new  shock sets  in) 
b(  why  equal  upward  and  downward  shifts  may  not  be 
symmetrical in their effects12 
c(  Why  inflation may jump  up across the  "sound barrier" m 
under an  exogenous shock (J  (  or  down across  the  barraer  when wage 
and  price controls (-e( are  imposed. 
While the  theoretical discussion given  here  is not formally  a 
complete account  it does provide  sufficient theoretical basis  for 
the  empirioai  analysis  that  follows.  We  first  return  to  an 
application of  the  accounting  framework for defioit  finance  given 
in  Section  III. 
ll)The  ed—hoc  assumption  still  has  to  be  justified  within a 
fully-fledged  asset  model.  It  does,  however,  make  intuitive 
sense  for  the present example.  Here it would imply that  reel 
money balances fell  by more  than expected and the  reel  interest 
rate rises to equilibrate excess  money demand (or ekcess supply 
of real bonds).  For some empirical  support see below p. 
12(tonsider  the case of  a step devaluation  e at  line  t  =  a. 
We have from equation (14) applied at  t = a  and  a + 1  that 
—  =  (nt÷1 
—  m(  +  )n  — m2)  =  (1—8)  s — 
(1-Ô)(l-Th(a  Aa  =  s)1-6([l-5)l-d)] 
This is  positive end rising with  2  (which  itself  rises  with 
ia) 
.  If the general thrust of n- is upward (to  a higher stable 
equilibridm at B,  say( ,  a  devaluetibñ  will thus  accentuate  the 
inflationery acceleration. —  77  — 
V.  Deficit Finance and Equilibrium Inflation Rates,  1965-1986 
we  now  apply  the accounting  framework  presented in Section 
III  to the Israeli inflation  data,'3>  in an  attempt  to  account 
for  the  main  components of the stepwise shifts in the  inflation 
rate into and  out  of the high  inflation  period.  The  issue  of 
stability will he taken up in the next section. 
Table  2  gives figures on the budget deficit and its finance 
by the three major categories (money, domestic debt and  the  sale 
of  foreign  exchange)  during  the period 1981-1986.  A few major 
changes stand out for the period after 1983.  one  is  the  sharp 
rise  in the deficit in  1984,  after  a temporary drop in 1983,  both 
fluctuations to be traced  primarily  to  the  tax  revenue  side. 
Secondly  we  note the sharp drop in the  share  of finance from  the 
domestic debt issue  since 1983  and  its  replacement  by  foreign 
exchange  sales,  evidence of the loss  of confidence after  the bank 
share crisis of 1983,  with e partial rebound in the first half  of 
1985  (mainly  sales  of a foreign  exchange linked domestic asset, 
PATAM, as part of the speculative  move  into  a  foreign  exchange 
linked  hedge,  in addition to straight foreign exchange outflow) 
Third and last we note again the  sharp  drop in the deficit in  the 
course  of  1985  (already  noted  in Table 1)  and the very marked 
change in the composition  of finance,  mainly  between  money  and 
debt,  a  reflection  of the  rise  in the demand for money with the 
reduction in  (expected)  inflation. 
Table  3  applies  the  framework  of  equation  (4)  to  the 
inflation profile and budget finance data over a  20 year period in 
which inflation increased  in  stepwise  fashion  from  5  to  400 
percent  per  annum.  This is  a comparative dynamics exercise.  For 
each sub—period we calculate the difference  between  the  deficit 
ratio  (d)  and the part of the growth in domestic financial assets 
that individuals would be willing to hold as GNP  increases  {nv  = 
n(h+b) I.  The  ratio  of the resulting  net injection  to the money 
base  (line  7)  is then  ompared  for consistency with the underlying 
inflation  rate  (line  8),  under  a  hypothetical  steady  state 
assumption, as was shown in equation (4)  of section III. 
13)  This is done along the lines given  in  an  earlier  analysis 
[Bruno  and  Fischer(l986)],  that was confined to the period up 
to 1983. —23— 
As  indicated  in a previous study [Bruno and  Fischer  (1986)] 
the  shift  from one phase to another could be related, during the 
high inflation  period, to three important developments:  the  rise 
in  the  deficit  )d)  between the wars (1968—73),  the fall  in the 
growth rate )n)  after the 1973—74 crisis  [see Melnik  and  Sokoler 
(1984)],  and  the  probable drop in the demand for money schedule 
[h)  )] after  197724.  Also  noted  was  the  marked  discrepancy 
between  the  injection ratio  and actual inflation during 1981—83, 
anticipating the sharp subsequent jump  in inflation at the  end  cf 
1983,  which  looked  consistent  with  the underlying  budget  finance 
data.  We  note  in  hindsight  that  in  the  subsequent  period 
(1984—84:2)  the  reverse relationship  held,  with  actual  inflation 
far exceeding the underlying government injection  ratio,  which was 
already  consistent  with  the  eventual lowering of the inflation 
rate (we return to this  point below) 
Line )9)  in Table 3 gives hypothetical  numbers of the  supply 
of  real  money  balances  )h)  that would equate  lines  (7)  and  )8), 
i.e.,  the numbers are derived from the ratio  )d- vn)/n.  Thus,  in 
the period '81—83 the  data  are consisent  with  a disequilibrium in 
the direction of  'excess  money supply'  (monetary  expansion)  while 
in  84-85:2 it is consistent with a converse 'excess  money demand' 
(monetary  contraction)  situation.25 
In the post stabilization period  (1985:3—86,  column  7)  h 
rose  dramatically,  the  deficit ratio continued  to fall,  and the 
lower net injection ratio (30 percent)  is  quite  consistent  with 
the new low inflation rate  (25 percent during the  first 18 months 
14)This  is  linked  to  the  liberalization  of  foreign exchange 
markets of  October  1977,  in  which  a  new  liquid,  foreign 
exchange  linked,  asset  was  introduced  )PATAM,  see  above)  — 
close  substitute for conventional  money. 
15)Real interest rate behavior  is  indeed  consistent  with  this 
characterization  (see respective Bank of Israel Annual Reports 
for 1983—1985). —  24  — 
of  the program, in annual terms) .'  Finally,  column 8 in Table 3 
gives  a  hypothetical  set of numbers for zero inflation which is 
consistent  with a 4 percent growth, a further growth in the  money 
base  ratio  to  8 percent, say,  and a government domestic deficit 
finance ratio of  4 percent (implying  a surplus of 1—2 percent when 
interest payments are excluded) 
We  first reexamine this  table using the  model  of Section II, 
by assessing the  applicability of the demand function  for  money. 
A  number of empiricial studies have  been conducted at the Bank of 
Israel in  •recent years (see  symposium in Bank of Israel,  Bulletin 
60,  November 1985),  mainly centering on the semi-logarithmic form 
of equation (5).  Estimates by Melnik and by Ben-Eassat and  Narom 
(see  above  symposium  and introduction by offenbacher) put the  a 
coefficient for quarterly data at about 5  (strictly  speaking,  the 
estimate  is  4,75).  This  figure implies that the elasticity of 
demand for  money  (an)  turns  unitary when  the  monthly  inflation 
rate  exceeds  6.5  percent  (or  115  percent in  annual terms).  Let  us 
look  at the  implied  a  estimate as  we  move  from  one  sub—period  to 
the  next,  in Table 3, namely, we calculate the proportional rate 
of change of  h  (from line  2) and divide it by the change in  the 
rate  of  inflation  between  respective  periods (translated into 
quarterly data) .  The  following  set  of numbers is obtained for the 
relevant high-inflation period: 
to period  Implied a 
1974—77  4.4 
1978—80  4.8 
1981—83  8.0 
1984—85:2  0.9 
1985:3—86  4.4 
l6)The  1  percent  GNP  growth rate for  this  period is  an everage 
between a drop in the second half  of  1985  and  a  2  percent 
increase  in  1986.  With  2  percent  GNP growth rate the net 
injection  ratio  would  drop  to  10  percent.  Obviously  the 
estimates  are  sensitive  to  small  changes in the underlying 
parameters and should only be regarded as a very rough guide. —  25  — 
Thus  the  first  two  observations  and  the  last  seem  quite 
consistent with the estimate suggested, while the third and fourth 
very high inflation  periods  diverge  substantially  up  or  down, 
respectively  (on  average,  interestingly,  they do  fit...).  The 
very high figure for  the  early  1980s  has  given  rise  to  the 
argument  that  there was  a  shift in the demand  for money  schedule 
on  account of  PATAM  and  other money substitutes that  became  very 
widespread  during  this period, thus  illustrating the analysis of 
section III  (shift from curve  h to h'  and from point A'  to  C'  in 
Figure A)  .  How  could one then rationalize the very low figure  for 
1984—1985:2?  One possible explanation  for  the back— shift in  the 
demand for  base  money could be the  decision  to  pay higher interest 
on  commercial  bank  deposits with  the  Bank  of  Israel,  evidence  for 
which  can  be  found  in  line  9  of  Table  6  in the  years  1983  and 
1985 : (1+2)  .  But  this  would  require  deeper  analysis .  It  is 
interesting  to point out,  however,  that  the  tripling of  h  in  the 
post-stebilizaton  period is entirely consistent with  an  inflation 
semi—elasticity  that  was  estimated  econometrically  for  the  earlier 
highiy  inflationary  era. 
How  could one  account  for  the  large  discrepancies  in  the 
bottom  lines  of  Table  3  during  the  high  inflation  plateau 
(1980—83)  and the period of runaway inflation (1984—85:2)? 
I believe  s potential explanation lies  with  the  theory  of 
dual  inflationary  equilibria  and  the possibility  that  in  those 
years  tne  eoonomy  was  on  the  move  to  an  inefficient,  high 
inflation  equilibrium  of  the  type  B'  (Figure A).  First we  note 
that with  an  annual  inflation  rate  of  141  percent  (7  percent 
monthly)  the  elasticity  of  demand  for  money may  have passed  the 
unitary,  'optimal',  inflation point,  or  was  very close  to it.  If 
the  net  injection  ratio  of  219  is  any  indioation of  the  long—run 
equilibrium inflation at  that  time,  it  certainly  satisfied  the 
high  level  equilibrium  characteristics  (the  inflation  rate 
certainly did  in  the  subsequent period)  .  We  shall  argue  below 
that  the  stability  properties  of  the high  inflation equilibrium 
were  also  consistent with  such an  argument. 
The  more  interesting discrepancy  came  in  the  next  •period 
(1984—85:2),  however.  We  note  that  by then the net injection 
ratio had already  come back to the 1968—73 level  )i) i.e.,  the  d' 
curve had shifted  back to  d, and yet the  net  inj  eotion ratio (and 
even more  so  the  runaway  inflation)  were  placed  in  a  very 
different  environment.  First  of  all,  it  gives  the  best 
illustration of  the  multiple equilibrium  nature  of  the  system. —  26  — 
Even  if  we  correct for a possible shift in the h(  )  function  in 
the intervening  years,  there is no doubt that the pair 18 and  119 
(in  line 7)  or 11 and 385 (in line 8)  together  with the pair 13.4 
and 2.1 for  h  (line  2)  can  be  consistent  with  the  same  net 
injection  ratio  only under a multiple equilibria interpretation. 
But  if  at  that  point  the  economy  was  at  a  high  inflation 
equilibrium,  and  if,  in  fact,  that  was  a potentially stable 
equilibrium, then it is no  wonder  that  a  fall  in  the  budget 
deficit,  without  any  accompanying  measures that  would make for 
synchronization of nominal magnitudes at a credible  low  rate  of 
devaluation  and  wage-price  inflation,  could shift  the  economy  to 
an even higher  rate of  inflation  (e.g.,  from  B'  to  B).  This  in 
fact  took place  as  a  result of  a  balance-of-payments-induced price 
shock  (i.e.,  a large  devaluation),  making  for  a  jump  in  the 
inflation rate  (see  section IV) 
The same  argument holds with no less  force for the shift  into 
the actual stabilization period.  Note  that  under  the  present 
imterpretation  the  further  fall  in  the  domestically  financed 
deficit ratio (and  even  more so in the net  injection  ratio)  was 
only  marginal,  yet  the fall in the inflation  rate was dramatic. 
It can only be explained as a shift back  from  a  high  inflation 
equilibrium  trap to  its dual low—inflation equilibrium,  along the 
lines of dynamic adjustment given  in  Section  IV,  to  which  we 
shall return below. 
Figure  B  is an attempt to give numerical content to Figure A, 
using the data of  Table  3  (observations  are  numbered  by  the 
columns  of  Table  3).  Curves  d50  and  d2.5  represent  the 
hyperbolae  h-it  = d  for the  two  injection  ratios  5%  and  2.5% 
respectively.  Curves  m  and m'  represent  money demand schedules 
before and after the shift caused by  the  introduction  of  money 
substitutes.  For each of the problematic periods 1982-83 (col.  5) 
and  84-85:2  (col.  6)  two  observations  were  introduced,  the 
original  one and one based on the hypothetical  h as given in line 
9 of Table 3. 
According  to  this  analysis  the  hypothetical  upper 
inflationary  equilibrium  before stabilization  was situated at an 
annual rate of about 700 percent  (actual  inflation  being about 400 
percent,  was  thus  "on  the  way"  to  700),  while  the  lower 
inflationary equilibrium was around  50  percent  (observation  7, 
which  represents  the  post-program  inflation  rate  is  at  an 
intersection of curve  rn  with  a  constant  injection  curve  d1.9 
which  is  not  marked  on  the  diagram).  Point  8  represents a -27— 
hypothetical  bliss  of  zero  inflationary  equilibrium 
(intersection  of  rn  with  the  curve  d0  which is the pair of 
co—ordinates). 
Two questions immediately arise:  First,  if the change in the 
relevant  part  of  deficit finance  was so marginal why is so much 
emphasis  placed on the dramatic cut in the deficit  (see Table  2)? 
Secondly,  if  the  economy  actually  shifted  to  a  low  level 
equilibrium,  what would guarantee its stability? 
The answer  to the first question hinges on the  important  link 
between  the  budget  and  the balance of payments which removed an 
important source of pressure on the exchange rate.  The cut  in the 
budget  deficit helped bring about  an almost equivalent cut  in the 
current account  deficit of the balance of  payments  (commensurate 
with  the  dramatic  drop in foreign exchange sales to the public. 
see line 8 in Table 2) which,  together with the step  devaluation, 
made  the  exchange rate  freeze  credible.  In the  terminology  of 
section IV we would say that  the expectation of another jump  in  c 
and rt  due  to the J-term was  snarply reduced. 
For  the  answer  to the second question, on the stability  of 
the new low  level  equilibrium,  we turn back  to  the  analysis  of 
dynamics and the stability of multiple equilibria. 
VI.  Dynamic  Adjustment  and  the  Stability of the High and Low 
Level Inflation Rates7 
We now return to the analysis of the dynamics  of  adjustment 
(see  Section  IV)  and  in  particular,  to an attempt to give  the 
dynamic  adjustment  equations  (9)-(ll)  [or,  rather,  (ila)] 
empirical content. 
Consider  first the COLA adjustment of wages.  I have run  two 
kinds of regressions of wages  on  present  and  lagged  inflation 
rates,  one  based  on  quarterly data,  the other on monthly data, 
aggregating the results to  a three-month equivalent coefficient of 
adjustment  ('p).  If  we  consider  quarterly data for the period 
1965-1985 and break the period down into three  sub-periods  (each 
with  roughly  20 observations) the implied adjustment coefficient 
l7)Research assistance for  this  section  was  ably  provided  by 
Eran Yashiv. —  28  — 
comes  out  as follows:'9 
1965:1—72:4  0.40 
1973:1—78:4  0.57 
1979:1—85:4  0.79 
This  confirms,  in  broad  outline,  the  claim  that  the 
within—quarter  adjustment  coefficient  has  risen,  and  in fact 
doubled in  the  course  of  the  inflationary  process.  Let  us 
remember  that  in  1980  the  frequancy  of  adjustment  of the COLA 
increased from a six to  a  three  months  lag  and  the  rate  of 
indexation  increased  from  70  percent  to  80  percent.  Mora 
recently, in October 1983,  the agreement  switched  to  a  monthly 
adjustment  formula,  a  12 percent threshold and an 80-90  parcant 
indexation coefficient. 
To obtain  a  finer sub—period breakdown we  have to  use  monthly 
regressions  for  wage  adjustment.  Table  4  gives  the  resulting 
estimated coefficients for the wage  equation  ), line  2)  end  the 
exchange  rate  adjustment  equation  )i5,  lines  3  and  4)  for 
sub—periods starting with  the  introduction  of  the  crawling  peg 
(the  observations  run  starting  1975:1)29).  The  exchange rate 
adjustment  coefficients listed include  both quarterly art  monthly 
based  regressions,  with  the  resulting  calculated p:iduct  (B  = 
a-)  given in  lines  5  and  6,  respectively.  Finally;  lines  7  and 
8  introduce estimated coefficients for  equation  )lla)  run directly 
on  consumer  and wholesale prices,  respectively. 
l8)The  regression was  run  for  each  sub-period  separately  in  the 
form 
wt 
—  =  a1  )n2 
—  flt_i)  +  a2(n9_1 
—  n2_2)  +  as)nt_2 
— 
(1  +  a1)  is  taken  as  the  coefficient  for  the  quarterly 
regressions  and  (1  +  a3)  as  the  one  in  the  monthly 
regressions. 
19)The  exchange rate regression  was  run  as  in  (9),  adding  a 
correction  fdr U.S.  wholesale prices within the  brackets.  For 
each regression dummy variables  were  included  in  the  relevant 
periods  in which step  devaluations  took  place  (since these  are 
rete  of  change  regressions,  the  dummies  were  introduced  in  two 
consecutive  periods  each time.) From the various series of estimates it  seems  that  the  0 
coefficient  that  we  were  looking  for  did  indeed  behave 
monotonically over the  four  sub-periods.  Given the fact  that  the 
a  coefficient of the demand for money equation is of the order of 
4—5,  any 0 that exceeds 0.20-0.25  would  be  consistent  with  the 
Cagan  condition  of  stability  being  violated.  Given the above 
tentative results one could thus  argue that  up to 1977:2  stability 
was  probably  still  maintained only at the low inflation  rate  of 
around 40 percent per annum.  During the subsequent  two periods it 
may  have  been  slightly above  or on the borderline of stability, 
while during the last high inflation  period (84-85)  stability  has 
certainly  also  characterized the high level  equilibrium point  B 
or  B'  ,  thus  substantiating  the argument  made  in  the  preceding 
section,  with  the  low level  inflation rate becoming unstable at 
the going wage and exchange rate  adjustment mechanisms. 
An alternative, more direct,  way of  testing  whether  the  0 
adjustment coefficient is itself inflation-dependent  is to specify 
a linear relation  0 = ff + 02n,  estimate equation (ha)  directly 
by non—linear methods  and test whether 0  > 0. 
The  following  difference  equation  was  estimated over the 
above sample  of  123  monthly observations (1975—85): 
)hlb)  at  —  at—i  = 0  +  (0  + 8it_))n 
—  it'5_1 
—  s...,)  + J, 
Here t  =  rate of devaluation 
= rate of inflation 
= U.S.  rate of inflation 
= Dummy variables for discrete devaluations of 
1975)IX—X), 1977(XI—XII)  and  1983  (X—XI) 
The equation was  estimated  once for  n in term  of the consumer 
price  index  (CDL)  and  once  for  the  wholesale price index  of 
manufacturing  goods  (WHP)  The  resulting  coefficients  and 
threshold inflation ratio (*) are: —  30  — 
71* 
________  132  monthly  annual 
COL  —0.29  9.33  5,8  97 
[0.99]  [373] 
WHP  —0.43  12.74  4.8  76 
1.39]  [  4.97] 
Figures  in  square  brackets  are  t-  values.  Estimates  are 
corrected for serial correlation. 
The threshold inflation rate  (n*) has been estaated from  the 
condition  13  =  13  -f-  13=  m  =  (1  + a)—'  which is the difference 
equation analog of the Cagan stability  threshold  condition  aB=l. 
The implication  is that as long as the inflation rate  is less than 
5.8  (or 4.8)  percent a month (97 or 76 percent  in  annual  terms, 
respectively)  ,  inflation  will  adjust  to  the  lower  inflation 
equilibrium  (since  then  a13<l)  while  starting  from  a  higher 
inflation rate  it will diverge to the upper equilibrium. obviously 
these results depend on equation (lib) being the  maintained  rule 
of  crawling  exchange  rate  peg  adjustment  under  accelerating 
inflation, barring  special  events  (e.g.,  balance  of  payments 
crisis)  for  which  one  time  adjustments  of  the exchange rate 
(represented  by 3) are being made. 
We note  that  the  above  estimate  of  a  critical  monthly 
inflation  rate  of  about  5  percent  (the  'sound barrier' shove 
which the process diverges) conforms to one's intuitive  hunch  as 
to  what  the  "danger zone"  in this  type of stabilization program 
may be  (both Brazil and Argentina,  for  example,  have,  at  some 
stage,  overshot this rate and their programs started getting into 
very serious difficulty) 
It is important to point  out  that  the  estimated  equation 
)llb)  is  an exercise in ex—post interpretation  of historical date 
in terms of a hypothesized policy adjustment rule.  Policy  rules 
are  man-made  and  can  be  changed  and  obviously the numerical 
estimates should not be read as necessarily strictly applicable at 
the tail end to which the  stabilization  program was directed.  Part 
of the program design can  in fact  be interpreted as an attempt  to 
make  a  new low level inflation stable.  A discussion of a number 
of ingredients in the program and  its  evolution  should  clarify 
this  point. A  major  component  of  the  program  was  a  government 
preannounced commitment to exchange rate  stability  on  condition 
that  the  trade  unions  take care  of wage stability.  With price 
controls added on and  a fiscal  cum  monetary  squeeze  it  is  an 
extreme application  of  equations (9),  (11) or (ha) with a  =  w  = 
=  0 and the fiscal and monetary squeeze (as well as adequate extra 
foreign  finance)  guaranteeing J  =  0.  Viewed as  a  (differential) 
game played by the unions and  the  governmentzo)  the  stability  of 
the  equilibrium  depends  on  government's  credibility  and 
reputation building.  The  first  few  months  of  the  program's 
implementation  provided  such  a credibility test.  When wages in 
the business sector overshot in the expectation,  based  on  past 
experience,  that  the government would accomodate  with an exchange 
rate  devaluation  (so  as  to  keep  export  profitability  from 
falling),  such  devaluation  did  not  take  place,  causing  a 
temporary profit squeeze and  a downward  correction  of  wages  in 
some  manufacturing  industries.  Eventually,  only a year later (in 
January, 1987)  was another step  devaluation  of  10%  undertaken, 
again  coupled  with  an  agreed  COLA  suspension  and  a  tax 
compensation to employers.  This  became part of  a new,  this  time 
more  credible,  precommitment  to an exchange rate stabilization 
policy. 
In terms of  the model presented in section  IV,  this  is  a 
case  in  which the coefficient 0=0  and  a step  devaluation (J)  is 
coupled with an incomes policy (-ar) at the same  time  so  as  to 
neutralize  the  shock  to  (n  -  n_)  [see equation (14)]  and 
thereby confine  inflation  to  the  vicinity  of  the  low  level 
equilibrium point. 
Next,  the  COLA itself was corrected in the course of 1986 
to conform to a lower inflation rate  (moving  up the threshold  for 
wage  compensation  from  4 to  7 percent cumulative price increase 
and  a reduction of the  compensation  rate  to  70  percent) 
.  The 
result  of  both  of  these  steps  and the smaller price increase 
prevented the need for actual COLA payments for almost a year. 
20) A relevant bargaining model was analyzed by  Horn  and  Persson 
(1986) 
.  In  their  model,  however,  the trade—off is between 
inflation and unemployment  (in  the  export  industry).  More 
relevant  in  the  present context is the trade-off between the 
current  account  (supplying  foreign  exchange  relief)  and 
inflation. —  32  — 
The  imposition  of initial prioe controls was  a  part  of  the 
social  contract demanded by the  unions.  While those controls  were 
not  effective during the initial stages of the program  they  did 
help  in  kignalling  the  government's  serious intentions.  Their 
gradual removal in the course of the  subseguent  two-yeer  period 
without  any  clear  signs  of  repressed inflation emerging added 
another element of credibility.  The best test of the public belief 
in  the  success  of  the  program,  which in turn  helped keep  the 
exchange rate  stable, was a large inflow  of capital.2'- 
VII.  Concludang  Remarks 
In our  empirical application  we  have naturally  concentrated 
on  the  Israeli example.  An interesting  line  of  further  research 
would be to cast  the simultaneous  experience of  other  countries, 
like that  of  Argentina or Brazil  (and  more  recently,  Mexico)  ,  into 
the  same  analytical  mould.  This  has,  to  the  best  of  our 
knowledge,  not yet  been  done.  It could,  however,  be  observed that 
the  reason  for  a  less  successful outcome in  Argentina  and  Brazil 
probably  lies  with  both parts of the heterodox package.  In the 
case of Argentina, for example, which was the first and also  more 
serious  attempt  at  stabilization,  the  initial  correction  of 
fundamentals appears  to  have  been  insufficient  -  the  fiscal 
squeeze  had temporary more  than  permanent  elements in it,  and  the 
external  adjustment  problem  appeared more  serious  then  Israel s, 
making  an  exchange rate freeze less  credible  and  more  short-lived. 
But  the  initially synchronized wage-price freeze  also appeared  to 
be  more  shaky  on  account  of  a  trade union movement  that  was 
politically less  collaborative  than  its  Israeli  counterpart.  It 
21)  Another  element making for stability  of a new  'eguilibrium' 
is the bureaucratic  feed-back mechanism by  which  mistakes  in 
policy  or  unanticipated disturbances are  quickly detected  and 
reacted  upon by corrective measures.  In the Israeli case  this 
role  was  at  least in part played by a follow-up committee  of 
bureaucrats with direct access to the Minister of  Finance  end 
the  Prime  Minister.  In  this  sense  the post-reform decision 
making mechanism should be part  of  the  design  for  ecobomic 
reform,  since  it  affects  the stability  properties of the new 
equilibrium. —  33  — 
is  hard to make a more  concrete  assessment  of  the  differences 
between  the  countries  without  an  analogous detailed empirical 
comparison.22>  Let us now turn back to more general remarks. 
We have used the example of a  recent  'shock'  stabilization 
program  to  illustrate the way the concept of  economic reform can 
be placed within acceptable theoretical and  empirically  testable 
frameworks.  Even our  particular  example still  has  to be worked 
out  more  fully.  For  our  present  purpose,  however:  it 
illustrates a  principle.  The underlying idea is the existence of 
multiple stable equilibria for  the  economy  and  given  a  dear 
preference  ordering  over  these  equilibria,  a  reform  program 
consists of a shift from  one stable or  quasi-stable  equilibrium, 
which  is  inferior (or  a point on the way  to such equilibrium)  to 
another, superior,  equilibrium  (or  a  process  by  which  such 
equilibrium  can  be  reached),  which  can  be  made stable by a 
suitable reform design. 
We note  the rather eclectic role  of  'econometrics'  in  our 
exercise.  statistical  econometrics  can  be  used  for varioua 
fragments or building stones of the jigsaw puzzle,  as  was  indeed 
done  here,  but  prubably  not  as  a  complete  estimable  model 
structure. The conservative nature of backward looking time  series 
modelling limit the use of the larger econometric models for  this 
purpose because the extrapolation  of  the  past  under  a  regime 
change  is  fraught  with difficulties.  At the  same  time there are 
other,  complementary  ways,  of  bringing  the  past  historical 
experience  (sometimes  not  even  quantifiable)  to  bear  on the 
understanding of the potential ingredients of an economic  reform. 
It  requires  a  marriage  of  different  subfields  all  of which 
constitute 'econometrics'  as  practiced  by  the  members  of  our 
society.  of  all  required  components  I would put  the greatest 
emphasis on the need for  one  unifying  analytical  framework  or 
'theory'  which  can  then  be  filled with smaller sub-models and 
missing  facts.  Facts  alone,  even  if  ordered  or  analyzed 
correctly  from  a purely 'statistical'  point of view,  can naver he 
a good basis for policy, if there  is no attempt to understand  how 
the system to be guided actually 'ticks'. 
22)For  the  separate  country  studies  see  Bruno,  Di  Tella, 
Dornbusch, and Fischer (1988). —  7a  — 
In  a lecture on experimental economics  given  at  the  last 
World  Congress  of  our  Society  I heard Alvin Roth mention four 
types  of experiments in economics: The first one  is  'speaking  to 
theorists'.  The  second is  'searching  for meaning'.  The third is 
'searching for  facts'  and the  fourth  and  last  is  'whispering  in 
the  ears  of princes',  which I  take to be the politicians. 
Speaking  of  politicians,  I  would like  to end with a quote 
from Joseph Schumpeter  who,  believe it or not,  happened to be  one 
of  the  founding fathers  of  our  Society.  (Here  is  an  interesting 
question  - would  he  be  elected Fellow  of  the  Econometric  Society 
to-day?  Or  else,  would he be  interested  in being  elected,  given 
the highly technical  segmentation of  our  discipline ?)  In  the 
1933  issue  of  Econometrica  that  I  have  already mentioned  an 
article of  his, entitled  "The  Common  Sense  of  Econometrics",  ends 
in  a  paragraph which runs  as  follows: 
"The  only way  to  a  position  in which our  science might  give 
positive  advice  on  a large  scale  to politicians and business  men, 
leads  through quantitative work.  For  as  long  as  we  are  unable  t.a 
put  our  aruments  into  figures,  the  voice  of  our  science, 
although  occasionally it may  help  to dispel gross  errors,  will 
never  be  heard  by  practical men.  They  are,  by  - instinct, 
econometriciams  all  of  them,  in their distrust of anything not 
amenable to exact proof." 
Princes in  Schumpeter's days  may have been  a  special  breed. 
I  am  not  sure w: ether  I  would buy this  statement  of  Schumpetar' a 
as  far  as to-days politicians'  optimal  menu  is  concerned,  at 
least  not  chose  in whose ears  I have recently been whispering. I 
do, however, subscribe to the contents  of a preceding paragraph in 
the  same  article  having  to  do  with  the  mix of  'speaking  to 
theorists' and  'searching for  facts' which is as  relevant  to-day 
as it seemed 55 years ago: 
23)  A  reader  of  a previous draft of this  paper quipped at this 
point:" Or would he be Schumpeter to-day?".  I hope he could. —  35  — 
"Theoretic  and 'factual'  research  will  of  themselves  find 
their  right  proportions,  and we may not unreasonably expect to 
agree in the  end  on  the  right kind of  theory  and  right  kind  of 
fact  and  the  methods  of  treating them,  not postulating  anything 
about  them by program,  but  evolving  them,  let  us  hope,  by 
positive achievement." 
I  hope this  discussion will be a small  contribution towards 
further evolution  of  theory and fact  in  the  continued  'search  for 
meaning'  of  how  policies  ought to be rationalized. Princes  and 
politicians  come  and  go,  some  of  them  more  receptive  to  our 
whispers  than others.  It befalls  on  us  in  the profession,  in  the 
meantime,  to  improve  our  basic understanding of  how  and  what menus 
to  prepare  for future plans of  action and  reform. —  36  — 
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h B. Corey and credit )aonthiy  percentage  rates) 
Octal  bank  8.6 
credit 
2.  4uasi-sney(y3 )elo7 
3. Means of 
nayment (8,)  8.6 
4.  Interest  rate 
(end-sf-period 
level) 
Real  exchange rate 
(new  besket(a 
keel  wage  (grass) 
Real  wage 
(eftar  tax) 
0. Budget  deficit)SOOP) iO,2b  5.0 
6. Aneaplxyment rate(t)  4gb  s,g 
F,  Balance of payments 
basic balance 
_0,2b  -0.3 
- 4' 
- 
TABLE  i 
-  £csnceic  Indicators 
Mean  904  1985  1986  1987 
1681-  (during 
604  year)  Jan.! Aug. 
-  Oct.-  Jan.- April-  July-  Oct. 
-  Jan.-  April- 
July  Sept.  Dec.  March June  Sept.  Dec.  March  June 
A.  Prices,  exchange rates and wages(asnnhly  percentage change  rates) 
1.  Consuner prices  8.1 
2. Wholesale prices 6,1 
3.  Eschange rate  8.8 
A.  B-currency  basket 
eoch.  rale  1.5 
5.  Aoninai  cage  6.0 
5.2  14.0  3.5 
5.2  12.0  1.8 
5.9  3.6  0.2 
15.3  5.3  2.7 
15.5  11.0  0.3 
2.l  0.6  2.1 
2.4  .2  1.1 
-2.1  0.0  0.0 
2.0  .5  0.5 
4.5  6.4  4.3 
.1  2.9  2.o 
.9  2.3  —1.0 
6.1  75.1  0.9 
1.0  2.2  7.6  7.3 
o,g  1.0  2.4  1.1 
0.0  0.0  2.0  -0.3 
3,3?  0.0  3,3?  -0.1 
1.1  0.2  0.6  u,g 
3.1  3.3  4,6  3.1 
3.2  3.3  4.3  1.5 




13.0  4.8 
73.0  3.5 
11.9  76.2 
21.0  14.1 
C. Relative price levels  (1980:100) 
7.2  4.0  3.6  3.5  4.0  4.0  u.1 
94  92  03 
108b  116  116° 




lOS  03 
95  106 
03  Ill 
4  3 
1.2 
98  96 
113  1 hA 
120  121 
7,9 
93  96 
II?  115 
24  123 
3  0  0 
95 
727 
2.0°  5d 
6.0°  7,9?  6.6  6.8  6.6  5.1  5.9 
0.6  1.2  -0.7  0.0  3.3  1.3  -0.2 
a. Relatixe wholesale prices of major trading partners (now  basket of  5). 
0.  wean,  1980-83. 
c,  Mean,  Jan-Jane 1986. 
d.  Mean,  July-Seyt. 1985. 
e. Money and liquid  assets, includes  foreign-currency  denand derosits. 
cuts  for Asg -Sept,  On August I,  1986  a  new basket was adopted. 
(The  tigura for July  was  2.3.) 
g.  In  Jan.  the 11.1.5. aas devalued  by  II percent relative to the S currency  basket. —12— 
Table 3: 000ESTiC  PUBLIC  SECTOR  DEFICIT (INCLUDING  SANK OF  IDFFELI 
END  ITS  FINANCING,  1980—1784 
-  -  (Percent  of OCR) 
1995 
1981  1988  1983  1984  1788 
Total  Jan.-  July— 
June  Dcc. 
1.  Comnonento  of 
Deficit 
eopendiouro  57,9  5°C  54.1  52.7  55.4  54.8  54 
50.5  52.7  72.8  58,4  52.8  5O,5***  54.Erea  540 
2.  Deficit  (cool. 
intereoc)  9.4  0.3  3.3  8.3  3.0  8.8  -0.2  —0.3 
Interest 
(adjusted)  2.2  0.8  2.8  3.8  5.7  5.9  5.7  5,3 
D.  Domestic  deficit 
(3, + t,)  il.4  (D.C  4.0  i2.i  9.01,2.3  5.7  2.8 
8.'Finarcino  of 
Deficit 
4.  Base  money 
creation  2.0  1.7  2.3  2.7  4.5  2.4  (0.6  1.9 
7.  Net domestic 
debt*  8.1  4.2  —1.0  0.2  —(.2  3.7  —6.i  —0.4 
2.  Foreign currency 
sales  1.9  2.8  4.3  9.6  8.2  7.4  2.2  8.5 
9.  Net  effect of 
monetary  policy*  —0.4  —0.6  —i.4  —0.2  —1.1  —l.2  —1.0  —(.4 
*  Financial asset  formation (inoloding  PATAMI  net of public credit to  private  seoDor. 
8-'Interest on the money  base,  plus  the fiscal  burden of  discount—cindoc  lending, 
less penalties  for liquiditf  deficits. 
"Estimale. 
Source: Bank of  Israel,  Annual  Report  1985, Table 9—4. 
1784 — Bank of Israei  estimate. -  45  — 
Table  3.  Government  Injection  to Honey  Base and the  Rate  of Inflatjo0 
5965—5988 
(Percent ages) 
1965—  1968-  1974-  1978-  1981-  1984—  1985:3-  Hypo-  1967  1973  1977  1980  983  1985:2  5986  thetjcal 
equi- 
librium 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
' 
(6)  - 7)(8) 
5,  Financial 
asset  ratio 
(h  ÷  b)lOO  (0.5)  0.8  1.0  1.1  1.3  5.2  1.3 
2.  Percentage 
money  base 
to GN'P  (h)  12,5  13.4  9.8  5.2  2,7  2.1  6.1  8 
3.  GN'P growth 
(n)  3.2  10.3  2.6  3.5  2.3  2.0  1.0  4 
4.  Domestic 
governoen  t 
finance 
ratio  (d)  2.2  8.8  7.3  9.3  8.9  4.9  3.1 
5.  Of  which: 
Growth factor 
(1.  x 3.)  1.6  6.2  2.6  3.9  3.0  2.4  1.3 
6.  Net injection 
(4.  —5.)  0.6  2.4  4.7  5.4  5.9  2.5  1.8  0 
7.  Net  injection 
mcney  base 
(6/2.)  5  58  48  104  219  119  30  0 
8.  Inflation 
rate  .  5  U  40  97  141  385  25  0 
9. Hypotetical 
moey  Supply 
(h 
I 4)—(5 >17(8)  12.5  21.9  11.8  5.6  4.2  0.7  7.3  .  8 
Note :This table  is an  extension of Bruno  and Fischer  (1986),  Table 4, 
which  only  covered  the period up to  1983  [o1umnsU  -(5) 1. 
All nui±ers  are in percentages  except  for  line  1  which is a simple ratl 
Sources:  Line  1  —  Yariv  (1982) plus  update  1965—67 figure assumed same as 
1970  1968—1973 is the average for 1970—73.  Line  2 — Bank or 
Israel,  Annual  Reports.  Line  3 —  CBS.  Line  4 —Meridor (1985) 
plus  update.  Line 8 -  CBS. —  44  — 
Table  4.  Estimated  Dynamic  Price  Adjustment  Coefficients,  1975—1985 
1975:1-  1977:2-  1979:4-  1983:3— 
1977:2  1979:4  1983:3.  1985:3 
1.  No.  cf monthly  observations  24  31  45  24 
2.  Wage sdjusant coeff.  ()  0.44  0.53  0.87  0.77 
Exchange  rate adjustment  (41 
3.  Quarterly  0.57  0.83  0.38  0,75 
4.  Nonthly  -0CC  0,12*  0.34  0.88 
Price  adjustment  coefficients 
Calculated  (4i) 
5. = 2.  3.  0.25  0.33  0.31  0.50 
8. * 2.  4.  -0.02  0.08*  0.30  0.68 
Esormated  (4) 
7.  Consraar  0.27*  0.32  0.41  1.02 
8.  'holasale  0.13  0.30 
.  0.70  .  1.54 
9.  Exchamga  rate  duias  IX—X  El—Ill  —  I—Il 
1975  1977  1983 
Coefficient  insignificantly  different  from zero at 5  percent level. 
Sources:  Lin&2 — Coefficient  (1 + so)  in monthly wage adj. equation  (8). 
Line  3 — Quarterly exchange  rate adjustment  equation (9), with— 
-out dunias. 
Line 4 — S  of-3  first coefficients  in legged monthly exchange 
rata adju.stmant  equation  (:9),  with  duias  for periods 
given  in Lina 9. 
-  - 
Line 7 — Based  on  monthly  regressions  with  (  replaced by 
it 
(for consu.mar  prices). 
Line 8—  As in Lina 7,  with  it  representing  wholesale prices. —  45  — 
TECHNICAL  APPENDIX- 
High Inflation Traps  and  Rapid Disinflatior 
1.  The Banic  Model  (see section  HI) 
We here detail  the model of Section  III  only for the case of  no bcnds,  i.e, 
v r  h.  When the-  real rate of interest  is exogenous,  generalization  to the 
money and bonds case is  straightforward Asse a  semi—logarithmic  demand 
function for money  (e  =  expected inflation), 
H/PY  h =  exp(—a) 
This is equation (5)  in the text.  Now assume deficit  finance  by oney—base 
creation, 
- 
H/PY  (H/H)h = d 
This is equation  (1)  in i(e text  for  the  cas,.  0. 
From  (Al)  and  (A2) 
- 
d  =  8h  = 8  exp(—aa) 
where  8  H/H  is the growth rate of high—powered  money.  This shows  as 
curve  GD  in Figure Al. 
Differentiating (Al) with respect  to time we obtain 
1  This Appendix is partly based on Bruno  and Fischer  (  1984,1987) -, 
The case where the real interest rate is endenous is technically messier 
(It is worked out in the above 1987 paper).  Here our eccvhasis  is an 
illustration off the case of dual stable equilibria  which was not taken 
up in the  above papers. 
- —  46  — 
APPENDIX,  p.  2 
(Al') 
share  is actual inflation and  n  is the growth  rate of  GNP. 
In steady state,  ke  = 3,  and we have 
(A4)  = Kr  9  — 
This  is equation (2) in the. text, and shows en the 45'  line  with intercept 
n  in Figure Al.  There are two possible steady  states  (at most),  A  and 
B,  with  A  the low—inflation and  B  the high—inflation  equilibriur.  As 
d  increases,  GB  shifts to  GB'  ,  the  losinfIetion steady  state  rises 
from  A  to  A'  ,  while the high—inflation  steady  state  shifts  leftward 
iran  B  to  B'  ,  with  the  inflation  rate felling.  Maximum saignorege  is 
obtained  when  d = c'exp(an1)  end  X = 1/a  — n  [Friean  (lBTl)). 
Now consider adaptive expectations  (for an elternetive  interpretstion 
in terms  of exchange rate adjustment  see section  IV) 
(AS)  k 
This  is equation (6)  in the text.  Substituting  for  x  fran (Al') we get 
(AG)  (1 - a)1q(9 - n — te) 
where  B = d exp(mxe), from (A3),  This is equatiob )8)in thetext. 
For slow expectations  adjustment  (4  4  l/a),  ke  >  0  for  t,  <  B — n, 
i.e., below the 45 line,  and  4  0  for  x  >  S — n  (see Figure  Al). 
Thus for the case  af3 4 1,  A,  the lower  inflation  equilibrium  in Figure  A 
(if it exiats) is stable,  and the higher  inflation  rate  et  B  is unstuble. 
These  roles are reversed when  cr41 >  1  (see Figure  91).  This  will also be 47  — 
APPENDIX,  p.  3 
the  case for rational  expectations  which can be represented  as the limi- 
ting  case  a  or  = a  always. 
The two cases  can equivalently  be represented  in  ae—  space,  when 
the  GO  and ' curves  are no longer  independent  of  the process of 
adjustment  (see Figures A2,  32,  respectively). 
2.  Variable Adjustment Coefficient 
Consider now  the case in  which  the  adjustment  coefficieqt  in  equation (A5) 
becomes  inflation—dependent  and we have 
(A5')  3()(t  7te) 
where  ' >  0  and  assume  (0) ( l/cz. 
The interpretation  is that as inflation  rises it becomes  liar to 
make mistakes and therefore the response  to  unanticipated shocks will be 
more rapid.  In  the text (section IV)  we replace this ncdel and its 
interpretation  with one based on exchange rate adustmerit. 
Since  )  0,  there exists  a  critical value, , t  which  3() 
1/a  (see Figure  Cl)  .  It now becomes of crucial  importance as  to how the 
A  and  B  intersections of,the  GO  curve with  the  =  0  line relate  to 
the point  D  at which x  = c$  on  the  GG  line  (D  is  a  singularity 
point).  We  have the following cases: 
(a)  <  xs <  xl  A stable,  B  unstable 
(b)  xl  (  A unstable,  B  stable 
(c)  a. ( xl  K  xa  Both A and  B are stable. —  48  — 
4PPENDIX, p.  4 
Case (c)  is clearly of special  interest because  it gives rise to multiple 
stable  equilibria sad therefore  to a rationale  for a discrete  step in stab- 
ilization  policy involving  more than just s cut in the government  deficit. 
The analysis  in  terms  of  Figures  A  or Cl  is  of necessity incomplete 
because  we  have said nothing shout sotuel inflation.  As  it turns  out,  the 
threshold expectation level,  4,  here causes  some special dichotomy in 
inflation  behavior.  Let  us  consider  case (c)  where  XA  K  4  K  tn  This is 
3how12  in Figure  C2. 
From  equations  (AS')  and  (AS)  we  know  that  except at  4  we have 
d  exn(ate)  — n  - 
(A?)  I 
—  m13(it) 
mr  a13 r 1 
while for  in  we have 
(AS')  in  =  13(x  - )  = Md' exp(zxe)-n  - 
Cifferentieting  (A7.) with respect to  x.  we get, for the slope  of the 
CC  curve in  itlie  space, 
(AS) 
dx  = cz(ç3'(x  — ze)  — (xe)  + d  exp(axefl 
dx  1 — 
It  follows that at the points  A  and  B,  where  it  un,  dz/due  is the 
seine as for the constant  13  case 1sinoe  the  '  term  in (B)  vanishes].2 
Consider now the range  xa  K Xe  K  4,  Here  a13  K  1  and  in  K  C 
At 
dx  cz(x  + n) 
—  o4  x  = xe  = XA,  = 
1  — 
K  1,  since  a(  + n)  K  1 
while at 
-  dx  mp—o(x+n)  = lie 
—  Its,  = 
—  1  '  since  o(x 1- n)  >  1 -  49  - 
APPEHDIX,  p.  5 
S  Se  to  the left of the  e =  line. Therefore the numerator 
on  the right  hand side of equation (AS')  must be negative. But  this means 
that close  to the  m  level, when  m13  1,  the numerator of ecuation  (A?) 
must also become  negative,  namely,  the  UG  curve  in that branch  must even- 
tually cross  the  a  axis and  m -  a  as  a  —  (from below) 
For  a sjilar reason  it follows  that  in the range  a.  as 
(a 
—  1)  >  0  and the numerator of  (A7)  must  be negative abd  positive, 
with  a —  ÷  a  as  a.  —  a  (from above). 
Here  a  shift  to  a higher deficit ratio will  show in the corresoonding 
shift  of the  two branches (to  the right  in  the lower region and  to  :he left 
in  the upper region).  Figure C2 also includes a case where a higher  deficit 
ratio  gives  a curve  GG1  for which  both equilibria  are in the upper 
region,  now the lower  one (A') being unstable  and for  low  enough  a 
becoming  asymptotic to the  ml  line from  above. 
Repeating the expebiment,  previously  discussed,  of moving from the 
initial point  B'  to a  lower deficit  together with an 
incomes policy that pulls  a.  credibly  below  ml,  we  first move to the 
point  E,  say, on the lower branch of  GG,  which  is enough  to get u.s 
eventually  to the point  A.  Note that for this case the actual inflation 
rate falls  at first  by more than  ae  ,  while  the adjustment  process  from  B 
to  A  will invclve a further  fall in  't  as  a  rises to the new equilib— 
riLn at  A.3 
Ne  have  also marked  the point  B  on  Figure Cl.  Note that  9  behaves 
monotonically during  the transition,  the growth  rate of money falling 
(with  the fall in expectations)  while inflation  must rise — the 
numerator in (A7)  rising by more  than the  denominator. F
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